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My name is Allan Hunt. I am Acting Manager of Research at the W. E. Upjohn
Institute for Employment Research in Kalamazoo, Michigan. The Upjohn Institute
is an endowed, nonprofit organization that has been engaged in conducting and
publishing policy-oriented research in the broad areas of employment and
unemployment since 1945.
We have just completed a project on the employment implications of
robotics. It was initiated at the request of the Michigan Occupational
Information Coordinating Committee and reflected the keen interest within the
State of Michigan in robots and their employment impacts. My colleague Timothy
Hunt and I spent the last 13 months examining the employment impacts of
robotics and have just published a book relating the results of that research.
I will be drawing .freely from this volume in my testimony today.
What is the essence of our findings? We believe the robots are coming; not
as rapidly as anticipated by some nor with the devastating impact predicted by
others, but they are coming. Furthermore, we all have a stake in the impending
change, at least to the extent that robots will be part of a movement to raise
the productivity of American factories and retain the competitiveness of
American goods on national and international markets. We argue that robots
should be regarded simply as another labor-saving technology, one more step in
a process that has been going on for some 200 years.
Before proceeding it is necessary to put the so-called "robotics
revolution" into some perspective. There are precious little hard data about
industrial robots today. Most of the public awareness of robots has been
shaped by the hyperbole in the popular press. Futurists and others compete for
media attention with wild projections of the impacts of robotics--800,000
people making robots, 1.5 million technicians maintaining robots, and millions
of workers displaced with little or no consideration of the practical issues
involved. We believe the intense media attention on robotics in the past year
or so has seriously confused the issues.

First, we submit that the very use of the word "revolution" is
inappropriate when dealing with any manufacturing process technology. Capital
goods for production have long lives and are not scrapped immediately when
something better comes along. Numerically controlled machine tools, usually
regarded as the capital equipment most closely related to robots, expanded at a
growth rate of only 12 percent for the most recent ten-year period. After 25
years, only 3 to 4 percent of all metalcutting machine tools are numerically
controlled. Even digital computers, widely heralded as the most significant
technological innovation of the 1960s and 1970s, expanded at a growth rate of
only 25 percent (excluding microcomputers for home market). Yet many are
implicitly assuming much higher growth rates for industrial robots. In terms
of actual application, process technology changes tend to be evolutionary
rather than revolutionary because of the physical, financial and human
constraints on the rate of change of process technology.
Second, the fear of massive unemployment caused by the introduction of
industrial machinery appears to be unfounded historically. Such fears began
with the dawn of the industrial era in the 1700s. They are particularly acute
during major recessions. For example, the "automation" problem was of urgent
national concern in the early 1960s after a halting recovery from the sharp
recession of 1958-59. There were grim predictions that automation was causing
permanent unemployment in the auto industry and other industries. A national
commission was appointed to study the problem and in 1966, with the economy
near full employment, the commission rendered its final report. They concluded
that a sluggish economy was the major cause of unemployment rather than
automation.
Third, there appears to be a fundamental lack of understanding that the
association of technological change, economic growth, and job displacement is
not just a coincidence; they are intertwined and inseparable. That is not to
imply that adoption of new technologies necessarily insures economic growth, or
that displaced workers will always find new jobs. However, it does mean that
we all have a vital stake in productivity gains (i.e., in displacing jobs)
because that is what allows the possibility of rising real incomes. The price
of a growing, dynamic economy that makes more goods and services available to
all of us is job displacement, or the elimination of jobs through technological
change.
In our book we assess the direct impact of robots on the employment picture
in the U.S. and Michigan between now and 1990. Our data were gathered from
published sources and through interviews with robot manufacturers, robot users,
and other experts. Still, it was necessary to resort to considerable
projection and estimation. This creates the opportunity to be extravagant, but
we tried to avoid this. We selected the conservative, but realistic
alternative wherever there was a choice. All judgments and assumptions are
explicitly 'stated in the full monograph. Due to the space limitations here,
however, the emphasis is on conclusions rather than methodology.
U.S. Robot Population
The projections of occupational impact in our research are the result of
first forecasting the U.S. robot population by industry and application areas.
This approach constrains the employment impacts to reflect the actual expected

sales of robots. In this way a consistent economic framework is established
within which it is possible to estimate not only the population of robots and
job displacement but also the job creation resulting therefrom. This
consistency is also very helpful in avoiding unrealistic or exaggerated
conclusions. Table 1 shows our robot population forecast for 1990.
We expect strong growth in the utilization of industrial robots in the
decade of the 1980s. We forecast that the total robot population in the U.S.
by 1990 will range from a minimum of 50,000 to a maximum of 100,000 units.
Given our estimate of the year-end 1982 population of approximately 7,000
units, that implies an average annual growth rate of between 30 and 40 percent
for the eight years of the forecast period, or roughly a seven to fourteenfold
increase in the total population of robots. As shown in Table 2, our forecast
tends to be on the conservative side compared to other published estimates.
However, the upper end of our range is generally consistent with other
forecasts.
Our projected range is intended to contain the actual robot population with
a high probability level, and allows for variation in interest rates, capital
investment climate, auto industry recovery, and rate of economic growth. We
are confident this range will contain the 1990 robot population. That means we
do not expect developments such as the total collapse of the automobile
industry, a major renaissance in U.S. capital investment, the early development
of a significant number of nonmanufacturing robot applications, or the
widespread adoption of robotics technology by small firms.
The U.S. population of robots is developed separately for the auto industry
and all other manufacturing. This is partly to take advantage of the fact that
the auto producers have announced goals for robot installations which could be
factored into our robot population forecast. It also reflects the fact that
the major impact of robots in the State of Michigan will be in the auto
industry. Our forecast sees 15,000 to 25,000 robots employed in the U.S. auto
industry by 1990. If the auto firms were to exactly meet their announced
plans, there would be approximately 20,000 robots in U.S. auto plants by 1990.
Job Displacement
Utilizing the robot forecast by industry, and the assumption of a gross
displacement rate of two jobs per robot which was strongly supported in our
interviews, estimates of gross job displacement (the elimination of job tasks
rather than actual layoffs of workers) can be derived. We estimate that robots
in the U.S. will eliminate between 100,000 and 200,000 jobs by 1990. from
30,000 to 50,000 of these will be in the auto industry, while 70,000 to 150,000
jobs in other manufacturing industries will also be eliminated.
In addition to the assignment of robots by industry, it was necessary to
forecast the applications for which they will be used. This is required if the
robot population forecast is to be useful in predicting occupational
displacement. Otherwise there is no way to connect the robots with the work
content of specific jobs. The application areas used in our research are
welding, assembly, painting, machine loading and unloading, and other.

When the robot forecast by application area and industry is matched against
an occupational data base similarly organized, specific occupational
displacement rates can be estimated. These results are shown in Table 3.
Although the maximum overall job displacement rate in manufacturing of 1
percent through 1990 is not particularly problematical, specific industry and
occupation displacement rates are very significant, even dramatic.
To begin with, the displacement rate derived for the auto industry ranged
from 4 to 6 percent of all employment. But when displacement was calculated
only against the production workers in the auto industry, the magnitude of
displacement was from 6 to 11 percent. Even when considered to be over a
period of a decade, these rates of job displacement are significant.
When specific occupational displacement rates are calculated, even more
striking results emerge. Our results suggest that between 15 and 20 percent of
the welders in the auto industry will be displaced by robots by 1990. Even
more dramatically, between 27 and 37 percent of the production painter jobs in
the auto industry will be eliminated by 1990. While displacement results are
generally less significant for specific occupations in all other manufacturing,
it is projected that 7 to 12 percent of the production painter jobs there will
be lost in the same time frame.
The conclusion of the job displacement estimates is that while job
displacement due to robots will not be a general problem before 1990, there
will clearly be particular areas that will be significantly affected. Chief
among these will be the painting and welding jobs for which today's robots are
so well adapted. Lesser impacts will be apparent on metalworking machine
operatives and assemblers. Geographically, states such as Michigan, especially
the southeastern quadrant with its heavy dependence on autos, will suffer
greater displacement than other states or regions.
We do not believe that this job displacement will lead to widespread job
loss among the currently employed, however. Table 4 compares the average
annual rates of displacement by occupation with the Bureau of Labor Statistics
estimates of average annual replacement needs and total job openings for the
same occupational groups. Clearly, the job displacement which can be expected
is much less than the occupational replacement needs for the foreseeable
future. Even in the auto industry, voluntary turnover rates historically have
been sufficient to handle the reduction in force that might be required. In
addition, the new General Motors-United Auto Workers contract, as one example,
seems to provide adequate job security assurances, and the retraining
commitment necessary to back them up. Thus we do not expect any substantial
number of auto workers to be thrown out of work due to the application of
robots. Any unemployment impact is likely to be felt by the unskilled labor
market entrants who will find more and more factory gates closed to the new
employee. Therefore, if there is an increase in unemployment as a result of
the spread of robotics technology, we fear the burden will fall on the less
experienced, less well educated part of our labor force.
Job Creation
Turning our attention to the job creation issue, we forecast the direct
creation of about 32,000 to 64,000 jobs in the U.S. by 1990 in four broad

areas: robot manufacturing, direct suppliers to robot manufacturers, robot
systems engineering, and corporate robot users. The jobs in corporate robot
users identify maintenance requirements for robots, while the jobs in robot
systems engineering identify the applications engineering requirements for
robot systems, without regard to industry of employment.
In these projections we assumed that the status quo would be maintained in
both the import and export markets for robots, primarily because of a lack of
any better information. But there is certainly no guarantee that U.S.
producers will maintain their share of the national or worldwide market. This
threat is especially menacing because of Japanese and European expertise in
robotics technology.
The projections of robot-related job creation by occupation are very
speculative because of the limited experience to date with robots and the
uncertainties involved in predicting the future occupational profiles of firms
that do not yet exist. However, the high technical component of labor demand
is quite startling. It can be seen from Table 5 that well over half of the
jobs created will require two or more years of college training.
The largest single occupational group of jobs created by robotics will be
robotics technicians. This is a term which is just coming into general usage;
it refers to an individual with the training or experience to test, program,
install, troubleshoot, or maintain industrial robots. We anticipate that most
of the new entrants to this occupation will be trained in community college
programs of two years duration. We project that jobs for about 12,000 to
25,000 robotics technicians will be created in the U.S. by 1990. We do not
anticipate a supply problem for robotics technicians, as the community college
system gives every indication that they will be ready and willing to train
whatever numbers are needed. In fact, our current concern is that they may, in
some instances, be increasing the supply too rapidly.
Specifically, a continuation of the expansion of the last year or so in
course offerings and enrollments in robotics technician programs on a national
scale will very quickly swamp the ability of the industry to absorb trained
people. There may already be as many students enrolled in these programs as
there are annual sales of robots. For that reason, we endorse careful
attention to the breadth of training. A firm grounding in theory and general
principles of electronics, controls, hydraulics, etc. will stand the graduates
of such programs in good stead whether they actually work primarily with robots
or not.
In the auto industry, we expect the robot maintenance requirement will
continue to be met by the members of the UAW Skilled Trades Council. General
Motors already has agreed to a retraining effort in excess of $80 million
annually. We believe the strong implication of the contractual arrangements is
that auto industry employers will not be required to hire from the outside to
meet their robotics technician needs. Other major robot users may follow the
lead of the auto industry, but it is impossible to predict that with assurance
at this early date.
There also will be a relatively large number of graduate engineers needed
to implement the expansion of robotics technology in U.S. industry. We

estimated the requirement from about 4,600 to 9,300 new engineers. While these
numbers are comparatively small, only one-fifth of one year's production of
engineers at the baccalaureate level, there is already a clear shortage of
engineers, so we start from a deficit position. In addition, we face the
challenge of other likely engineering demand increases as well as the
historical instability of engineering enrollments. Thus it is quite likely
that a shortage of engineers could compromise the expansion of robotics
technology. Thus we add our voices to those calling for immediate national
attention to the supply of engineers.
The most remarkable thing about the job displacement and job creation
impacts of industrial robots is not the fact that more jobs are eliminated than
created; this follows from the fact that robots are labor-saving technology
designed to raise productivity and lower costs of production. Rather, it is
the skill-twist that emerges so clearly when the jobs eliminated are compared
to the jobs created. The jobs eliminated are semi-skilled or unskilled, while
the jobs created require significant technical background. We submit that this
is the true meaning of the so-called robotics revolution.
Policy Implications
We suspect that these research results on the impact of robotics can be
generalized to other so-called "high-tech" areas. Data Resources, Inc. (DRI)
has produced a forecast for Business Week of the employment potential of the 92
SIC codes labeled high technology or high-tech-intensive by the BLS. For the
period 1983 to 1993, DRI projects 730,000 to 1 million jobs will be created in
this sector. This is about half the decline in manufacturing employment we
have suffered in the past three years due to the recession.
The most fundamental reason these high-tech employment areas will not
dominate in the near future is because they are so small now. We estimate
there are only 5,000 to 6,000 people employed in robotics today; only about
2,000 of these in robot manufacturing. The situation is similar for other
emerging high technology industries. "High-tech hysteria" notwithstanding, we
are confident that there will be more jobs created in Michigan by economic
recovery than by high technology for at least the next decade.
We also believe, however, that the changes created by the introduction of
the microprocessor to U.S. manufacturing in the future will alter the
occupational content of the demand for labor. This will not happen overnight;
it will be an evolutionary change. In fact, the skill-twist in the U.S.
economy has been occurring over the past 40 years or so. We believe there will
be less and less opportunity for employment by the unskilled or the
semi-literate in our economy in the future. Thus while robotics and the other
new manufacturing technologies do not create an immediate human resource
problem, over time they will add to our existing problem; an oversupply of
unskilled labor relative to demand.
When the Manpower Development and Training Act was passed by the Congress
in 1962, it was designed primarily to attack the problem of technological
unemployment. But as Willard Wirtz (Secretary of Labor, 1961-1969) puts it, we
quickly discovered we were working on the wrong woodpile. We did not have a
fundamental need for retraining of workers whose skills had been rendered

obsolete by automation; we faced a growing pool of labor (especially
disadvantaged youth) who had never acquired any skills in the first place.
Similarly in 1983, we believe the prophets of high-tech hysteria are
fundamentally misdiagnosing the problem. We do not have an enormous displaced
worker problem, if by that term one refers to workers who had good jobs with
substantial seniority who have been permanently separated from their employer.
The truly displaced workers, in our opinion, are those involved in plant
closing situations, not simple layoff due to lagging sales. We need a coherent
human resource policy to deal with the very difficult problems associated with
plant closure. Hopefully the JTPA displaced worker program will evolve in that
direction as local decision-makers implement actual programs.
We believe a major share of what is popularly labeled the displaced or
dislocated worker problem is purely cyclical and will disappear with an
adequate economic recovery. The truly structural problems will remain,
however, in the face of a job market which will increasingly require
significant skills for entry level employment.
Historically in the United States, we have followed a market allocation
strategy for human resources. Individuals prepare themselves for the job
market as they see fit. Even though substantial public subsidies may be
involved, there has not been any effective planning or coordination involved.
We allow students to choose their own careers with minimal constraints and only
the vaguest informational support. It is not necessary to abandon this
non-system, but it is necessary to make it more efficient in the task of
allocating scarce resources. Human resource decisions made by individuals can
be made more effective with the provision of up-to-date and reliable labor
market information. In addition, many youth have not made any decision, but
simply followed the path of least resistance. Increasingly this path will lead
to a dead end.
We cannot perfectly anticipate future occupational needs in great detail.
It would be difficult in a planned economy; it is impossible in a market
economy. There are too many influences on market events to make them
predictable in advance. We can, however, improve our efforts to provide
intelligence about general trends and to project their direction. The problem
has been that there was no adequate data base with which to discern trends as
they emerged. Until very recently we were dependent on decennial census data
for detail on the occupational content of our economy. Measurements ten years
appart are simply not sufficient to the task, especially when the method of
classification was changed with each observation as well.
I believe that the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) survey program
can provide an adequate remedy to this lack of information, if appropriately
funded and developed. This would include not only the data gathering and
analysis (which must be speeded up greatly if its usefulness is to be
maximized) but the dissemination of the information to individual decisionmakers. At a minimum, we need national projections and local data bases
sufficient to make the local implications of the larger picture apparent.
The evidence on the performance of job search skills training, job clubs,
and the like is sufficient to convince me that there are very significant

frictional barriers to employment for some. An improved labor market
information system is requisite to better performance in this area. In
addition, an adequate up-to-date data base for local labor market areas would
be of inestimable assistance for planning JTPA and other local training
efforts. Such a data base must have sufficient occupational detail to make it
useful in projecting the need for particular skills, but not so much detail
that it is confusing. Again, the OES data base possesses considerable promise
as a prototype for this effort.
In addition, I believe we must provide a better educational opportunity in
the first instance, and move to insure that our youth take advantage of this
opportunity. We must upgrade our science and technology training all along the
educational continuum. We need a new national effort similar to the National
Defense Education Act to upgrade preparation for the world of work. We also
need the techniques and the resources to insure that all our youth acquire some
useful human capital. At a minimum, we should make sure that they have
sufficient skills so that they can be retrained someday, if necessary. This
means basic skills like reading, writing and arithmetic. I would favor
competency-based standards in these areas for high school graduation.
One hopeful element here is the development of computerized individualized
instructional systems in the last few years. Such systems would seem to offer
great potential for teaching a large number of skills in non-classroom
environments. There should be more effort directed to developing and
implementing such systems. They would of course be useful for displaced
workers as well. General Motors has found the Plato system, for example, very
useful in retraining older workers who do not adapt well to a traditional
classroom environment.
It does not make sense that we offer special tax incentives for physical
capital formation only. If one wishes to make an investment in physical
capital today, there are investment tax credits, rapid depreciation through the
accelerated cost recovery system, and other public subsidies available. But if
one wants to invest in one's own human capital, it is only deductible if it is
required as minimal preparation for the job now held. If an individual wishes
to improve his/her position, s/he must bear the full private cost of such
investment. This is illogical and counterproductive. Individuals and firms
should receive tax credit subsidies to encourage private investment in human
capital. This simple step would signal the social interest in such investment
and help offset the rising cost of education due to declining direct public
subsidies.
Hopeful Signs for the Future
I would like to conclude my testimony by citing some developments that have
occurred or are about to occur that promise some relief from our current
situation. First, and most important, I believe the signs are now unmistakable
that the bottom of the recession is behind us and economic conditions will be
improving. Approximately 15 percent of the 1 aid-off auto workers have already
been recalled and I believe the prospects are good for further recalls.
Interest rates are down, prices are not up substantially, and tastes seem to be
changing back to larger cars in the wake of stabilized oil prices.

Second, the demographic trends in the next decade appear to be favorable
for reducing the additions to the labor force. While the number of youth (ages
16-24) in the labor force increased by 54 percent from 1960 to 1970 and 38
percent from 1970 to 1980, this component will actually decrease by 14 percent
in the decade of the 1980s. If we can insure that a large proportion of youth
entering the labor force in the '80s are prepared for the world of work, we may
be able to keep from adding to the existing unemployment problem.
Third, there is widespread evidence of recognition that we have some
significant human resource problems. The recent Commission report on the
quality of our educational effort is but the latest example. There has been
dissatisfaction with our educational performance from a number of
perspectives. Perhaps this report will help bring the debate to a policy
decision.
Last, there is at least a chance that the increasing incidence of
labor-management cooperation in the last few years may be permanent. This is
significant because of the potential productivity improvement that can
accompany increased cooperation between management and labor. Japanese workers
may not work any harder or any smarter than American workers, but everyone
seems to agree they do work more cooperatively.
Ultimately, there is only one satisfactory solution to the high cost
labor in the U.S. since this is also the basis for the American standard
living. That solution lies in the productivity of our human resources.
are to continue to be paid more than workers in other countries, we must
produce more than they do. Careful management of our human resources is
only way I know to accomplish that.
Thank you for your attention.
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Table 1
Forecast of U.S. Robot Population
by Application, 1990
Autos
Range of estimate

All other manufacturing
Range of estimate
High
Low

Total
Range of estimate
Low
High

Low

High

Welding

3,200
(21.3%)

4,100
(16.4%)

5,500
(15.7%)

10,000
(13.3%)

8,700
(17.4%)

14,100
(14.1%)

Assembly

4,200
(28.0%)

8,800
(35.2%)

5,000
(14.3%)

15,000
(20.0%)

9,200
(18.4%)

23,800
(23.8%)

Painting

1,800
(12.0%)

2,500
(10.0%)

3,200
(9.1%)

5,500
(7.3%)

5,000
(10.0%)

8,000
(8.0%)

Machine loading/unloading

5,000
(33.3%)

8,000
(32.0%)

17,500
(50.0%)

34,000
(46.0%)

22,500
(45.0%)

42,000
(42.0%)

800
(5.3%)

1,600
(6.4%)

3,800
(10.9%)

10,500
(14.0%)

4,600
(9.2%)

12,100
(12.1%)

15,000

25,000

35,000

75,000

50,000

100,000

Application

Other
Total

W. E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE
FOR EMPLOYMENT RESEARCH

Table 2

Selected Estimates of 1990 Sales, Population
and Growth Rates of Robots in the U.S.

Source
Conigliaroa
Aronb
UM/SME
Delphi0
Engelbergerd
RIAe

Unit
sales
1990

Value
(billions)
(1980 $)

1980-90
annual
growth rate
(percent)

Cumulative
population

31,350
21,575

2.0 +
1.9

38
36

122,000
94-95,000

33,333
40,000

2.0 +

45
35
35-39

150,000
150,000
75-100,000

NOTE: The 1980-90 annual growth rate and the cumulative population in 1990 are not
necessarily stated directly in all of these studies but can be calculated from data that are
provided.
a. Laura Conigliaro, Robotics Newsletter, Prudential-Bache Securities Inc., January 15,
1982, p. 7 and June 19, 1981, p. 8.
b. Paul Aron, "Robots Revisited: One Year Later," in Exploratory Workshop on the
Social Impacts of Robotics: Summary and Issues, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, July 1981, p. 34.
c. Donald N. Smith and Richard C. Wilson, Industrial Robots: A Delphi Forecast of
Markets and Technology, Society of Manufacturing Engineers, Dearborn, Michigan, 1982,
pp. 47-51, and Donald N. Smith, Peter G. Heytler, and Murry D. Wikol, "Sociological Ef
fects of the Introduction of Robots in U.S. Manufacturing Industry," Industrial Develop
ment Division, Institute of Science and Technology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor,
Michigan. Unpublished paper presented at the CAMPRO '82 Conference on Computer
Aided Manufacturing and Productivity, October 1982, p. 7.
d. Joseph L. Engelberger, Robotics in Practice, American Management Association,
AMACOM Press, New York, 1980, p. 115.
e. Robot Institute of America, RIA Worldwide Survey and Directory on Industrial Robots,
Dearborn, Michigan, 1981, p. 30.
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Table 3
Displacement Impact of Robots in the United States
by Application, Cumulative 1980 to 1990
Autos

All other manufacturing

Total

1980
employment
level

Displacement
range
(percent)

Welding

41,159

15 - 20

359,470

3 - 6

400,629

4- 7

Assembly

175,922

5 - 10

1,485,228

1 - 2

1,661,150

1 - 3

Painting

13,556

27 -37

92,622

7 - 12

106,178

9- 15

Machine loading/
unloading

80,725

12-20

988,815

3 - 7

1,069,540

4- 8

All operatives
and laborers

467,846

6- 11

9,954,048

1 - 2

10,421,894

1 - 2

All employment

773,797

4- 6

19,587,771

0- 1

20,361,568

0- 1

Application

1980
employment
level

Displacement
range
(percent)

1980
employment
level

Displacement
range
(percent)

SOURCE: Employment data based upon unpublished OES data provided by Office of Economic Growth and Employment Projections, Bureau
of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington. DC.
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Table 4

Displacement Impacts of Robots
Compared to BLS Estimates of Job Openings
Simple average annual
displacement impact of robots
1980- 1990*

BLS average annual
replacement needs
1978-1990

BLS total average
annual openings
1978 - 1990

Autos

All other
manufacturing

Total

All industries

All industries

Welding

2.0

.6

.7

2.3

5.1

Assembly

1.0

.2

.3

3.0

6.5

Painting

3.7

1.2

1.5

2.4

3.9

Maching loading/
unloading

2.0

.7

.8

2.5

3.0

All operatives
and laborers

1.1

.2

.2

2.9

4.0

All employment

.7

.1

.1

3.8

5.5

Application

SOURCE: Replacement needs and lolal average annual openings from The National Industry-Occupation Employment Matrix, 1970-1978, and
Projected 1990, U.S. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Bulletin 2086, Vol. 2, April 1981, pp. 495-502.
Assuming maximum growth in robot population.
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Table 5

Direct Job Creation in U.S.
Due to Robotics, by Occupation, 1990
Employment
Occupation
Engineers
Robotics technicians
Other engineering technicians
All other professional and
technical workers
Managers, officials, proprietors
Sales workers
Clerical workers
Skilled craft and related workers
Semi-skilled metalworking operatives
Assemblers and all other operatives
Service workers
Laborers
Total

Range of estimate
High
Low
4,636
12,284
664

9,272
24,568
1,328

936
1,583
581
2,908
2,163
2,153
3,763
138
279

1,871
3,166
1,162
5,817
4,326
4,306
7,526
276
558

32,088

64,176

